Critical infrastructure AI is now an OT control surface.
Tokto puts every prompt your control room operators, field engineers, scheduling teams, and vendor-shared AI tools run, every model output that touches a substation, a pipeline, a grid asset, or a port manifest, under one auditable trail FERC, NERC, TSA, CISA, and MARSEC can read.
A vendor AI assistant in the SCADA-adjacent admin plane is prompt-injected. The SOC sees a spike. No one can tie the prompt, the model, the asset, and the operator together fast enough. CISA calls. The press is downstream.
What you get with Tokto
- Every prompt and model output tied to an asset, an operator, a field event, a model version, and the operating state in force.
- A single audit log that satisfies NERC CIP, TSA SDs, CISA, FERC, MARSEC, and the SOC 2 auditor on the same evidence.
- Policy at the prompt: grid telemetry, port manifests, OT credentials, and ICS commands blocked before tokens leave the boundary.
- Air-gapped, on-prem inference. Raw OT data never leaves the control plane.
How it works
Tokto sits at the AI control plane of the utility and the port. Every control-room co-pilot, every field-engineer assistant, every scheduling model, every vendor-shared AI tool becomes a record at the moment of output. The record carries the asset, the operator, the event, the model version, the operating state, and the policy in force.
When CISA asks what your AI did before the incident, when NERC asks how CIP-005-7 applied across an AI integration, when MARSEC asks how port manifests were governed, the answer is one query against the system of record. The CISO controls one trail across IT, OT, and AI.
What goes wrong without it
- A Port of Seattle-class ransomware event hits a vendor AI integration. The Port cannot say what the model touched before isolation.
- A CIP-013-2 supply-chain incident through an AI co-pilot. No record. NERC violation per occurrence.
- An operator pastes a grid topology into a public LLM. Foreign-actor exposure in 48 hours.
- A port-side carrier AI integration leaks manifest data. State and federal agencies open joint inquiries.
On August 24, 2024, Rhysida ransomware shut down the Port of Seattle, isolating critical systems across Sea-Tac International Airport, Fishermen's Terminal, and public marinas. The Port refused a $6 million ransom; in 2025 it confirmed 90,000 individuals had their personal data taken. In March 2025 NERC issued CIP-003-9, CIP-005-7, CIP-010-4, and CIP-013-2 to harden BES Cyber Systems against ransomware and nation-state actors moving at machine speed across IT/OT seams.
See how Tokto makes enterprise AI visible, governed, and accountable for Security & Technology in Energy, Utilities & Ports.
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